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Abstract
Spatial cognition is central to human thinking, and spatial language is thus an important area of study, as it may reveal
fundamental properties of human thought. Recent research has shown that spatial language is much more divergent across
languages than had previously been thought, suggesting significant cultural patterning of spatial conceptualization. This
article reviews spatial language cross-linguistically, sets out a typological framework for the language of space, and considers
the relationship of spatial language to spatial cognition, in the context of extensive linguistic diversity in the spatial domain.
Spatial cognition is at the heart of much human thinking, as
evidenced, for example, in the explanatory power of spatial
metaphors and diagrams, and the explication of spatial
concepts has played a key role in the development of Western
mathematics and philosophy over two and a half millennia
(see Jammer, 1954). It is therefore easy to assume that spatial
notions form a robust, universal core of human cognition; this
assumption has dominated the cognitive sciences (e.g., Miller
and Johnson-Laird, 1976). But naive human spatial language
turns out to vary significantly across languages, both in the way
it is semantically organized and the way in which it is coded.
This has major implications for how we should think about
universals in human thought and language.
The Western intellectual tradition has provided an elaborate
metalanguage for spatial concepts, but the conceptual under-
pinnings of naive human spatial language utilize only a small
subset of these concepts. Moreover, there are many aspects of
our spatial perception and motor control which utilize much
richer and more precise representations of space than are coded
in language. The study of the representation of space in
language, and its relation to cognition, must therefore be
treated as an empirical enterprise, and this article reports on the
increasing body of cross-linguistic information about how
different languages structure the spatial domain (see Levinson
and Wilkins, 2006).
Space as a Semantic Domain
Languages tend not to treat space as a single, coherent semantic
field in the same way that they treat, for example, color (q.v.),
kinship (q.v.), or ethnobotany – rather, space is structured as
a large semantic field with many distinct subdomains, each of
which is closely structured (and often varies considerably
across languages). Nearly all languages have ‘where’ questions
that cover the entire field (i.e., with the same or morphologi-
cally related forms for ‘where-to,’ ‘where-from,’ and ‘where-at’)
and describe the location of one object primarily with respect
to another. But beyond these general properties, spatial
expressions are structured in distinct subdomains, notably
topology, frames of reference, and motion, with place names
and spatial deixis as complementary areas. These subdomains
cross-cut in certain ways (e.g., frames of reference may play
a role in motion description), but because they have their
own internal organization they need to be kept analytically
distinct.
Although the philosophical and scientific literature gives us
many different ways to talk about space, natural languages tend
to structure spatial description more in accord with the ideas of
Leibniz than of Newton. That is, location is thought about as
the place of one thing relative to another (rather than, as in
Newtonian thinking, as specifications in the coordinates of an
infinite, abstract three-dimensional ‘box’). We will call the
object to be located the ‘figure’ (F), and the object with respect
to which the location is specified the ‘ground’ (G); other
equivalent terms in the literature are ‘theme’ versus ‘relatum’ or
‘trajector’ versus ‘landmark.’ As Talmy (1983) noted, a good
ground or landmark object is larger than and less mobile than
the figure object to be located. The problems of location
specification then largely boil down to the following functional
considerations:
1. Where figure F and ground G are contiguous or coincident,
a static F may be said to be ‘at G.’ Where G is large, it can be
subdivided, so that F can be said to be ‘at the X-part of G.’
This is, roughly, the subdomain of topology.
2. Where F and G are separated in space, the problem is to
specify an angle or direction fromG in which F can be found
(the search domain). This involves a coordinate system of
some kind – a ‘frame of reference’ – of which there are three
main types found in languages.
3. Where F is in motion, two kinds of ground are especially
relevant: the source and the goal of the motion. To indicate
the progression of motion (i.e., the increase or decrease of
distance from a ground), motion can be specified as ‘F is
moving toward goal G’ or ‘F is moving from source S.’ In
addition, motion can be thought of as bringing about, or
destroying, a topological relation, as in ‘F moves into/out of
G.’ But to indicate a direction or vector of motion, both S
and G must be specified, or a coordinate system of the kind
mentioned in (2) utilized. Of course, motion can also be
specified as taking place within a location, in which case the
systems in (1) and (2) can be utilized.
These functional distinctions give us a number of cleavages:
stasis (or location) versus kinesis (or motion), nonangular
topological relationships versus angular relations specified in
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frames of reference, with potentially cross-cutting domains as
shown in Figure 1.
Some further details in Figure 1, like the three frames of
reference, are described below. But the two subfields that have
not been discussed further need to be mentioned here. One is
deixis, which concerns the way in which the location of the
speech participants can constitute a special ground or landmark
(as in here), which then makes interpretation dependent on
determining that location (as in He used to come here).
Languages universally seem to provide a structured set of
deictic elements with distinctions that are often spatial
(demonstratives like ‘this’ vs ‘that,’ adverbs like ‘here’ vs ‘there’).
Deictic anchoring of spatial expressions is, however, often
implicit or pragmatic: the local pub implies a pub close to some
reference point, which unless specified, is taken to be the place
of speaking.
A second subfield not treated further here is toponymy, or
systems of place names. Place names have been much investi-
gated from an historical point of view; since they are highly
conservative they reveal a great deal about the locations of
ancient languages and peoples. However, the theory and cross-
linguistic typology of place names – e.g., why some are
descriptive, others not – is hardly developed at all (see e.g.,
Hunn, 1993).
Universals and Variation in the Semantic Parameters
in Spatial Subdomains
In this section, the semantic parameters involved in spatial
description in twomajor subdomains are described to illustrate
some of the different ways in which languages structure the
spatial domain.
Topology
The subdomain of topology, as mentioned, concerns contig-
uous relations between figure and ground. The term is poten-
tially misleading – topology proper is a branch of geometry
concerned with constancies under continuous distortions such
as stretching, but, following Piaget (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956),
it is used in studies of spatial language to describe the sort of
spatial relations covered by the English prepositions on, in, and
at (Herskovits, 1986). These spatial terms are among the
earliest learnt by Western children, and it has therefore been
supposed that they form a universal innate core of spatial
notions. However, cross-linguistic studies show that universal
semantic concepts are only to be found at a more abstract level.
Take, for example, the spatial relations covered by English on, as
in The cup is on the table, The picture is on the wall, or The fresco is
on the ceiling – clearly the term on covers a wide area which is
already subdivided in the adpositions (prepositions or post-
positions) of many other European languages. Some languages
(like Japanese) conflate ‘on’ relations with ‘over’ relations (as in
The light is over the table) in their adpositions; others (like
Yukatek Maya) even include ‘under’ relations as well (as in The
ball is under the table). A detailed analysis of a dozen languages
from different families suggests that universal semantic
concepts in this domain lie at a more atomic level (Levinson
and Wilkins, 2006). If we think of the core prototype of
English on as consisting of the notion of vertical superposition
of figure over ground, with a horizontal ground supporting
a nonattached figure, then the kind of notions that look
universal are at the level of ‘vertical superposition,’ ‘contact,’
‘horizontal supporting surface,’ and (non)‘attachment.’Clearly,
these more abstract atomic concepts can be rearranged in many
different ways to constitute the semantic relations expressible
in an individual language (Levinson and Meira, 2003).
Topological relations are coded in the European languages
primarily in adpositions or case, but, as we shall see, these are
not the only possibilities – some languages code topological
relations entirely in nouns or verbs.
Frames of Reference
Linguists have presumed that there are two main frames of
reference, which are often called ‘deictic’ and ‘intrinsic,’ and
which can be illustrated by the ambiguity of the sentence The boy
is behind the bus – either the bus is between the boy and us
(‘deictic’) or he is at the rear of the bus (‘intrinsic’). Psychologists
have long known, however, that on the vertical dimension our
perceptual systems use three frames of reference against which
to measure uprightness: an object-centered frame, a viewer-
centered frame, and an environmental frame. Cross-linguistic
research shows that in fact these three frames of reference,
which we will call the intrinsic, the relative, and the absolute
frame, respectively, may be used on the horizontal plane too
(Levinson, 1996). These three frames appear to be universally
available, yet not all languagesmake systematic use of themall –
some use the absolute frame, others the relative frame, while
most use the intrinsic frame, and some use all three. The main
universal constraint appears to be that the relative frame is
dependent on the possession of the intrinsic frame.
The intrinsic frame of reference, as its name implies, has to
do with the intrinsic parts of ground objects. Recollect that
frames of reference are coordinate systems that specify angles or
directions from a landmark. One way to achieve this is to
designate a side or facet of an object, so that the figure can be
said to be located on an axis drawn from the center of the object
through the designated side. Most languages provide a vocab-
ulary for parts of objects, but the ways in which they partition
objects can be very variable. In English, for example, the criteria
Figure 1 Crosscutting subdomains of spatial language.
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for assigning the front of an object involve a complex mix of
functional and orientational information: the front of a bus is
the direction in which it canonically moves, the front of
a building is the side in which it is normally entered, and the
front of a television the side designed to be watched. In English
the top of a bottle remains the top even when tipped over, but
in other languages (like Zapotec) a more strictly orientational
approach may assign the ‘top’ to whatever side is currently
uppermost. Alternatively (as in Tzeltal), the assignment may
rely entirely on the internal axial geometry of the object, so
that, for example, the ‘face’ of an object may be a flat side on
a secondary axis, even if normally this is undermost. What all
these systems have in common is that they provide a system of
designated sides to objects which is independent of the posi-
tion of the viewer, and (apart from the vertical axis) indepen-
dent of an environmental orientation. How they achieve this
differs not only in detail but also in fundamentals.
Another way of obtaining angular distinctions on the hori-
zontal plane is to use the body axes of the viewer.We can then say
that something is, for example, to the ‘left’ of something else in
the visual field. Full versions of such systems use a left/right axis
and an orthogonal front/back axis, but again the way in which
they map bodily axes onto the ground object is very variable.
Although these systems are often called ‘deictic’ in the literature,
this ismisleading– they typically have a deictic center but theydo
not have to (as in He kicked the ball to the left of the goal), and the
other two frames of reference can also have deictic centers (e.g.,‘It
is north of us,’ ‘It is at my left hand’). Relative frames of reference
are, here, said to be ‘relative’ because they are relative to the body
axes of some observer. Some languages translate the bodily
coordinates onto the ground object without rotation; in such
languages (like Hausa) The boy is to the left of the tree means just
what it does inEnglish, butThe boy is in front of the treemeanswhat
in English is described as The boy is behind the tree. In contrast,
some languages rotate the axes, so that the front of the tree is
toward us, but the left of the tree is what in English wewould call
its right (this is probably aminority option, but is found in some
dialects of Tamil). Some languages reflect the axes, as in English,
so that left and right remain in the same directions as the viewer’s
body, but front and back are reversed or ‘flipped’ over.
Notice that terms like ‘front’ and ‘back’ and ‘left’ and ‘right’
also have intrinsic interpretations (as in He’s sitting at the chair-
man’s left), and for that reason ambiguities arise of the kind
illustrated above with The boy is behind the bus. Relative systems
are based on the intrinsic sides of humans, and probably arise as
extensions of an intrinsic system to objects (like trees or balls)
which resist the assignment of named sides. Hence the impli-
cational relation: all relative systems are associatedwith intrinsic
systems, but the possession of an intrinsic system does not
necessarily imply the use of a relative one. Relative systems had
been thought to be universal, but in fact it turns out that perhaps
asmany as a third of the world’s languages do not employ them,
instead making use of absolute systems.
Absolute systems rely on environmental gradients or
‘geocentric’ coordinates. Such systems use absolute directions,
or fixed bearings, a bit like English north, but unlike in English,
they are often used on all scales (as in The cup to the north of yours
is mine, or even There’s a spider on your northern leg), completely
replacing the need for relative systems. There are many different
varieties of absolute systems. Some of them (as in Australian
Aboriginal languages) are fully abstract cardinal direction
systems, with terms that may gloss ‘north,’ ‘south,’ etc., but
which denote quadrants or arcs of specific angle, and are often
based on bearings rotated from our cardinal directions. To use
a system of this kind, speakers must always orient themselves
precisely, using multiple environmental clues (wind directions,
solar angles, sidereal ecliptics, landscape features, and the like).
Other systems are based more directly on one major environ-
mental cue, like prevailing winds (as in languages of the Torres
Straits), river drainage (as in Alaska), a seaward/landward
distinction (as inmanyOceanic languages), or prevailing slopes
in mountainous terrain (as in the Himalayas). For example,
Tenejapan Tzeltal uses an ‘uphill,’ ‘downhill,’ ‘across’ system,
based on the general lay of the land in themountainous territory
of Tenejapa (Chiapas, Mexico), but the system has been
abstracted from the terrain to provide a fixed orientation, so that
the bearings remain constant outside the territory. Many
systems use fixed orthogonal axes, but not all; for example, the
Austronesian languages in the Pacific islands typically use the
monsoon winds as the basis for one axis, but an inland-sea
opposition as the basis for another axis; as one moves around
the island, the angles between the axes constantly change.
It is important to note that there are cognitive consequences
of relying on an absolute frame of reference for routine spatial
description on all scales. Communication using such an abso-
lute system requires that speakers’ mental computations are
adapted to enable constant background tracking of the coor-
dinate system(s) and ‘dead-reckoning,’ or updating of speakers’
locations as they move through the landscape (Levinson,
2003). Various cultural practices will support this background
tracking (e.g., absolutely oriented gestures, attention to move-
ments of the sun, shadows, and distant landmarks). Studies on
the use of pointing gestures in cultures where absolute systems
dominate in everyday use have contributed greatly to our
understanding of how spatial frames of reference are invoked,
communicated, and switched in conversational interaction, and
provided important insights into the cognitive background to
absolute systems (e.g., Levinson, 1997; Haviland, 2000, 2003;
Kita et al., 2001; Le Guen, 2011). They have shown that gesture
is deeply integrated into the system of directional reference,
making it clear that these are not simply linguistic systems but
broader communicative ones.
This raises the question of how children learn to use such
apparently cognitively demanding systems. There have been
a number of studies of children’s acquisition of absolute
systems (de León, 1994; Brown, 2001; Brown and Levinson,
2000, 2009; Cablitz, 2002; Dasen and Mishra, 2010). These
have generally found that children master the basics of their
absolute system relatively early – by the age of 6 or 7 –
compared with the acquisition of projective left/right in
European children which is often not fully mastered till age
11 (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). This result is consonant with
other work on child spatial language showing that children’s
language use reveals very early sensitivity to language-specific
semantic differences, adapting to the local system of spatial
categories from the beginning (e.g., Bowerman, 1996;
Bowerman and Choi, 2001). This is evidence that in this
domain the child must construct the relevant categories; these
are not given by innate endowment, contrary to what had
been argued for the spatial domain.
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How Spatial Distinctions Are Coded
in Language Forms
Much of the literature gives the impression that spatial distinc-
tions are primarily coded in adpositions, as in the prepositions
of English. In fact, in most languages spatial information is
distributed throughout the clause. Some languages have a score
ormore local cases (nominal suffixes) covering roughly the same
distinctions as English prepositions (e.g., Finnish or the NE
Caucasian language Avar). Other languages use a combination
of case and adposition (as in Tamil), or case and spatial nominal
(as in many Australian languages). Special classes of spatial
nominals (e.g., ‘front,’ ‘back,’ and ‘side’) do a lot of the work in
isolating languages like Chinese, and they play special roles in
other languages (cf front in the English complex preposition in
front of, and north in the adverbial use He went north). Many
spatial oppositions are made constructionally, as when German
prepositions like auf take the dative to indicate location but the
accusative to indicate motion toward a goal.
Finally, verbs play a crucial role in spatial description. In the
case ofmotion, there is often a special form class ofmotion verbs,
and languages tend to conflatemotionwithmanner (as inEnglish
crawl) or with direction or ‘path’ (as in Spanish salir: ‘to go out’),
but not generally both (Talmy, 1983, 2000). In many languages
(e.g.,Dutch), there isa small setof contrastingverbs (oftenderived
from posture verbs) used to describe static location, encoding
properties of the figure or ground, or both. Some languages have
a larger set (as in Tzeltal), and in this case most of the semantic
load is taken by the verbs, whichmay encode such specific details
as ‘be located in a bowl-shaped container’ (Brown, 1994). Where
the verbal component of locative statements is semantically
specific in this way, it can impose a spatial categorization on
objects in the world (e.g., long.thin.vertically.upright versus
horizontally.extended.in.three.dimensions) that is depicted in
gestures used when talking of putting and taking things; this
provides a window on the possible cognitive effects of these
categorizations (Ameka and Levinson, 2007). Even verbs
without such spatial specificity – e.g., verbs of motion like ‘go,’
‘come,’ ‘enter,’ and ‘exit’ (Wilkins and Hill, 1995; Kita, 1999),
and of caused motion or placement verbs like ‘put’ and ‘take’
(Kopecka and Narasimhan, 2011; Slobin et al., 2011) display
considerable cross-linguistic variability in their semantics. And
even closely related languages may differ in their ‘basic locative
construction,’ for example, in whether a preposition or a verb
provides the unmarked construction for describing locative
relations (as in Mayan languages; see Bohnemeyer and Brown,
2007).
In conclusion, it is clear that spatial concepts form
a complex semantic field made up of structured linguistic
subdomains. The semantic parameters involved may ulti-
mately have a universal base, but the way in which the
semantic subdomains are organized displays considerable
cross-linguistic variation. There is also cross-linguistic
variation in the way in which such distinctions are encoded
in the form classes of languages.
There is now a great deal more information about spatial
semantics in different languages than was available 30 years ago.
This includes detailed descriptions of the language of space in
different languages (e.g., de León and Levinson, 1992; Svorou,
1993; Dirven and Pütz, 1996; Danziger, 1998; Levinson and
Wilkins, 2006), and areal surveys of spatial language (e.g.,
Levinson and Haviland, 1994 for Mayan languages; Senft, 1997
for Oceanic languages; and O’Meara and Pérez Báez, 2011 for
Mesoamerican languages), as well as a number of cross-linguistic
comparisons of spatial language in particular semantic domains,
for example, landscape (Burenhult and Levinson, 2008), body
parts (Majid et al., 2006), locative verbs (Ameka and Levinson,
2007), placement verbs (Kopecka and Narasimhan, 2011), and
space/time metaphors (e.g., Majid et al., 2012). There is
therefore much more visibility for the range of cross-linguistic
variation that exists in the spatial domain and in the extension
of spatial meanings to more abstract domains like time,
kinship, and social relations. In addition, we now have some
initial evidence for distinct patterns of neural activation in the
brain for different frames of reference (Janzen et al., 2012).
This linguistic variation is especially interesting given the
centrality of spatial concepts in human thinking – and indeed it
has been shown that linguistic differences in frames of reference
can make a difference to how humans memorize and reason
nonlinguistically about space (Levinson, 1996, 1997, 2003;
Pederson et al., 1998; Majid et al., 2004; Haun et al., 2011).
There is robust evidence for several unrelated languages and
cultures (ranging from Mexico to Australia to Africa to Nepal
and Bali) that peoples’ frame of reference usage in
nonlinguistic cognition matches that of their language use.
This linguistic variation and the associated interactional and
cultural properties pose questions that are central to our
understanding of how language and cognition are interrelated,
how they are embedded in cultural practices, and how
children’s cognitive development may be shaped while they
are learning a language.
See also: Human Spatial Orientation, Neural Basis of; Spatial
Cognition During Infancy and Early Childhood Across Cultures,
Development of; Spatial Cognition; Spatial Navigation; Virtual
Reality and Spatial Cognition.
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